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Abstract. Vaudenay recently proposed a message authentication proto-
col which is interactive and based on short authenticated strings (SAS).
We study here SAS-based non-interactive message authentication proto-
cols (NIMAP). We start by the analysis of two popular non-interactive
message authentication protocols. The first one is based on a collision-
resistant hash function and was presented by Balfanz et al. The second
protocol is based on a universal hash function family and was proposed
by Gehrmann, Mitchell, and Nyberg. It uses much less authenticated bits
but requires a stronger authenticated channel.
We propose a protocol which can achieve the same security as the first
protocol but using less authenticated bits, without any stronger commu-
nication model, and without requiring a hash function to be collision-
resistant. Finally, we demonstrate the optimality of our protocol.
1 Introduction
Message authentication protocols are typically used to exchange public keys
so that secure communications can be set up. For a better usability, a non-
interactive protocol is preferred. It should be noted that the protocol uses two
separate channels. The first one is a broadband insecure channel (e.g. an email
or a wireless channel) and the second one is a narrowband authenticated channel
(e.g. authentication by a human voice or a manual authentication by a human
operator).
In SSH and in GPG, the simple folklore protocol used to exchange public
keys is presented in Balfanz et al. [BSSW02]. It is non-interactive and based on
a collision-resistant hash function. The authenticated string is the k-bit hashed
value of the input message m. We recall that this protocol is typically weak
against oﬄine attacks, such as birthday attacks, which have a complexity of
2k/2 and that hash functions which resist to collision attacks are threatened
species these days [BCJ+05,WLF+05,WYY05b,WYY05a,WY05]. For instance,
it is possible to forge two different RSA keys with the same MD5 hash as shown
in [LWdW05,LdW05].
Another protocol is MANA I which was proposed by Gehrmann-Mitchell-
Nyberg [GMN04]. It is based on an universal hash function family. This protocol
is more resistant against oﬄine attacks since it uses an authenticated value which
has a random part K. The second part is the hashed value (using K as key) of
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the input message m. The protocol requires to send the hashed value “at once”.
Hence, even if an adversary has an infinite complexity, his probability of success
is at most 2−k where k is the size of K and the size of the hash. However, the
requirement renders the protocol “less non-interactive” by imposing a strong
assumption on the communication model.
We propose a protocol which has the same security than the one presented by
Balfanz et al. [BSSW02] but using less authenticated bits and without requiring
the hash function to be collision-resistant. Our protocol is based on a trapdoor
commitment scheme in the Common Reference String (CRS) model or in the
Random Oracle model.
Finally, we propose a definition of the optimality of a message authentication
protocol and we analyze the three above protocols.
2 Preliminaries
The considered model is a communication network made up of devices which
use insecure broadband communication channels between them. In addition,
they can use a narrowband channel which can be used to authenticate short




Fig. 1. NIMAP Channels
Communication devices are located on nodes n of given identity IDn and can
run several instances which are formally denoted by a unique instance tag πin.
We concentrate on non-interactive message authentication protocols (NIMAP).
2.1 Adversarial Model against NIMAP
A message authentication protocol has an input m on the side of the claimant
Alice of identity ID and an output ÎD||mˆ on the side of the verifier Bob. Au-
thentication is successful if the output is ÎD = ID and mˆ = m. The protocol is
non-interactive if it only uses messages send by Alice to Bob.
We assume that adversaries have full control on the broadband communica-
tion channel. Indeed, an attacker can read messages from the channel, he can
prevent a message from being delivered, he can delay it, replay it, modify it,
and change its recipient address. Here, we adopt the security model from Vau-
denay [Vau05] based on Bellare-Rogaway [BR93]. The adversary has full control
on which node launches a new instance of a protocol, on the input of the pro-
tocol, and on which protocol instance runs a new step of the protocol. Namely,
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we assume that the adversary has access to a launch(n, r, x) oracle where n is
a node, r is a character, Alice or Bob, and x is the input. This oracle returns
a unique instance tag πin. Since a node can a priori run concurrent protocols,
there may be several instances related to the same node n. The adversary also
has access to the oracle receive(πiA) which returns a message m which is meant
to be sent to Bob and to the oracle send(πiB ,m) which sends a message m to a
given instance of Bob.
Typically, a NIMAP between nodes A and B with input m on the side of
Alice and using two messages runs as follows.
1. πA ← launch(A,Alice,m)
2. p1 ← receive(πA)
3. p2 ← receive(πA)
4. πB ← launch(B,Bob, ∅)
5. send(πB , p1)
6. ÎD||mˆ← send(πB , p2)
By convention, we describe protocols by putting a hat on the notation for
Bob’s received messages (i.e. inputs of the send oracle) which are not authenti-
cated since they can differ from Alice’s sent messages (i.e. outputs of the receive
oracle) in the case of an active attack.
On a global perspective, several launch(Ak,Alice,mk) and launch(Bℓ,Bob, ∅)
can be queried. These queries create several πikAk instances of Alice (authentica-
tion claims) and several πjℓBℓ instances of Bob (authentication verifications). We
may have a perfect matching between the k’s and ℓ’s such that related instances
have matching conversations which fully follow the protocol specifications, and
the πjℓBℓ ends with output IDAk ||mk for the matching k. In any other case, we
say that an attack occurred. We say that an attack is successful if there exists
at least an instance πjℓBℓ which terminated and output ÎD||mˆ such that there is
no k for which ÎD = IDAk and mˆ = mk. Note that many protocol instances
can endlessly stay in an unterminated state or turn in an abort state. We call
one-shot attacks the attacks which launch a single instance of Alice and Bob.
The attack cost is measured by
– the number Q of launched instances of Alice, i.e. the online complexity.
– the additional complexity C, i.e. the oﬄine complexity.
– the probability of success p.
Here is a useful lemma taken from [Vau05].
Lemma 1. We consider a message authentication protocol with claimant Alice
and verifier Bob in which a single SAS is sent. We denote by µA (resp. µB) the
complexity of Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) part. We consider adversaries such that the
number of instances of Alice (resp. Bob) is at most QA (resp. QB). We further
denote T0 and p0 their time complexity and probability of success, respectively.
There is generic transformation which, for any QA, QB, and any adversary,
transforms it into a one-shot adversary with complexity T ≤ T0+µAQA+µBQB
and probability of success p ≥ p0/QAQB.
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Assuming that no adversary running a one-shot attack has a probability of
success larger than p, using Lemma 1, we can upper bound the probability of
success of an attack which uses QA, resp. QB , instances of Alice, resp. Bob, by
QAQBp.
2.2 Authenticated Channels
When referring to “channel”, we refer by default to an insecure broadband chan-
nel without any assumption. As mentioned before, the devices can use an au-
thenticated channel. An authenticated channel is related to a node identity ID.
Formally, an authenticated channel from a node n has an identifier IDn. It allows
the recipient of a message to know the identity of the node from which the mes-
sage has been sent as is. Note that an adversary cannot modify it (i.e. integrity is
implicitly protected), but she can delay it, remove it, or replay it, and of course,
read it. Precisely, an authenticated channel does not provide confidentiality. By
convention, we denote authenticateIDn(x) a message x which has been sent from
node n through the authenticated channel.
The receive oracle maintains unordered sets of authenticated messages in
every channel IDn from node n. Only receive oracles with a π
i
n instance can
insert a new message in this set. When a send oracle is queried with any message
authenticateIDn(x), it is accepted by the oracle only if x is in the set related to
channel IDn. Note that concurrent or successive instances related to the same
node write in the same channel, i.e. in the same set. Thus, when an instance of
Alice sends a message, Bob can only authenticate the node from which it has
been sent, i.e. n, but not the connection to the right instance.
Weak Authenticated Channels. By default, authenticated channels without
any other assumption are called weak. This means that an adversary can delay
a message, remove it, or replay it. In particular, the owner of the message has
not the insurance that the message has been delivered to the recipient.
Stronger Authenticated Channels. In some cases we need special assump-
tions on the authenticated channel. We can consider stronger authentication
channels, namely channels in which additional properties are achieved as pro-
posed by Vaudenay [Vau05]. In the following, we use one possible property that
can be assumed on a stronger authentication channel. A stall-free transmission
assumes that when a message is released by a receive oracle either it is used as
input in the immediately following send oracle query or it is never used. Namely,
we cannot wait for a new message from Alice before delivering the authenticated
message to Bob.
For instance, a face to face conversation and a telephone call are clearly
authenticated channels. When one talks to the other one, the recipient further
knows that the message has not been recorded since interactivity implies coherent
conversations (stall-free).Mail, e-mail, and voice mail can be stalled and released
in a different order. Note that an e-mail without any cryptographic appendix
such as a GPG signature is in fact not an authenticated channel since it can
easily be forged.
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2.3 Hash Functions
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF). A collision-resistant hash
function is a hash function in which it should be hard to find two inputs x and y
such that H(x) = H(y) and x 6= y. Due to the birthday attacks, the hash length
must be at least of 160 bits.
Weakly Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (WCRHF). Weak collision
resistance means that the game of Fig. 2 is hard. Assume a (T, ǫ)-weakly collision-
resistant hash function H defined on a finite set X . Any adversary A bounded
by a complexity T wins the WCR game on Fig. 2 with probability at most ǫ.
A C
x
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− pick x ∈U X
y
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
winning condition: H(y) = H(x) and y 6= x
Fig. 2. WCR game.
Universal Hash Functions Families (UHFF). An ǫ-universal hash function
family is a collection of functions HK from a message space to a finite set {0, 1}
k
which depends on a random parameter K such that for any x 6= y we have
Pr[HK(x) = HK(y)] ≤ ǫ
where the probability is over the random selection of K.
2.4 Commitment Schemes
We can formalize a commitment scheme by two algorithms commit and open. For
any message m we have (c, d) ← commit(m). The c value is called the commit
value and the d value the decommit value. Knowing both c and d, the message
can be recovered using the open oracle, i.e. m ← open(c, d). Intuitively, a com-
mitment scheme should be hiding, meaning that for any c, it is hard to deduce
any information about the corresponding message m, and binding, meaning that
one cannot find c,d,d′ such that (c, d) and (c, d′) open to two different messages.
We also introduce keyed commitment schemes which have in addition a setup
oracle to initialize a pair of keys, i.e. (Kp,Ks) ← setup(). The public key Kp is
used in commit and open oracles. Keyed commitment schemes should be under-
stood as working in the Common Reference String (CRS) model. Namely, Kp is
a common reference string set up once for all and Ks is unknown to anyone.
Binding Property. The semantic binding (SB) game of Fig. 3 must be hard,
i.e. for any message m and any commit value c one cannot find two decommit
values d and d′ such that m ← open(Kp, c, d) and m
′ ← open(Kp, c, d
′) with
m 6= m′. The scheme is (T, ǫ)-semantically binding if any adversaries A bounded
by a complexity T has a probability to find two decommit values d and d′ which





−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ m← open(Kp, c, d)
m′ ← open(Kp, c, d
′)
Winning condition: m,m′ 6=⊥ and m′ 6= m
Fig. 3. SB Game.
is at most ǫ.
Trapdoor Commitment Model. The notion of trapdoor commitment was in-
troduced by Brassard, Chaum, and Crepeau [BCC88]. We define (T, ǫ)-trapdoor
commitment schemes by four algorithms setup, commit, open, and equivocate.
The first three work as before. The algorithm equivocate defeats the binding
property by using the secret key Ks. More precisely, for any (Kp,Ks)← setup()
we have
– for any m and any (c, d)← commit(Kp,m) we have m← open(Kp, c, d),
– for any m, by running (c, d)← commit(Kp,m), c is uniformly distributed,
– for any m, any cˆ, and any dˆ← equivocate(Ks,m, cˆ), the open(Kp, cˆ, dˆ) algo-
rithm yields m.
– for any adversary bounded by a complexity T in the SB game, the winning
probability is smaller than ǫ.
Note that this primitive is a particular case of strongly equivocable commitment
as described by Damg˚ard-Groth [DG03].
Trapdoor commitment schemes are perfectly hiding and computationnaly
binding commitment schemes. Note that for any (Kp,Ks) and any m, the dis-
tribution of (c, d), which has been yield using the commit algorithm, is equal
to the distribution of (cˆ, dˆ), which have been yield choosing a cˆ with uniform
distribution and using the equivocate algorithm.
For instance, a trapdoor commitment based on the discrete logarithm prob-
lem was proposed by Boyar and Kurtz [BK90]. Another trapdoor commitment
scheme was proposed by Catalano et al. [CGHGN01] based on the Paillier’s trap-
door permutation [Pai99]. The proposed scheme uses an RSA modulus N = pq
and a value h ∈ ZN2 such that its order is a multiple ofN . The public key isKp =
(N,h) and the private key is Ks = (p, q). The commit algorithm of a message m
picks uniformly two random values r, s and outputs c← (1+mN)rNhs mod N2
and d = (r, s). Note that the commit value c is uniformly distributed for any m
since r and s are uniformly distributed and (r, s) 7→ rNhs mod N2 is the Paillier
trapdoor permutation (see [Pai99]). We denote Fh(r, s) this permutation. The
decommit algorithm simply checks that c = commit(Kp,m) with d = (r, s). The
trapdoor is the collision-finding function: given a commit cˆ and a message m, one
can find dˆ = (rˆ, sˆ) such that cˆ = (1+mN)Fh(rˆ, sˆ) mod N
2 by using the trapdoor
on the Paillier permutation and knowing p, q, i.e. (rˆ, sˆ) ← F−1h (cˆ(1 +mN)
−1).
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Thus, given a cˆ, an adversary can find dˆ for any message m and thus defeats the
binding property.
Oracle Trapdoor Commitment. Finally, we consider trapdoor commitment
schemes in which commit, open, and equivocate are given as oracles (and not as
algorithms). In such cases, access to equivocate with an input cˆ equal to any c
which was output by commit is prohibited.
There is a very simple oracle trapdoor commitment scheme in the random
oracle model:
– The setup() algorithm is unused.
– The commit(m) oracle with input message m in {0, 1}k picks a random value
e in {0, 1}ℓ, builds d← (m, e), and calls the random oracle c← H(m, e).
– The open(c, d) oracle simply extracts m from d and checks that c = H(m, e).
– The equivocate(m, c) oracle yields a decommit value d = (m, e) such that c =
H(m, e) by modifying the table of H. This is possible without modifying the
final distribution of H, except with probability less than (Q+C)(2−ℓ+2−k)
since c is independent from previous oracle calls.
3 Previous Non-Interactive Authentication Protocols
3.1 A NIMAP Based on a Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
We first present a protocol taken from Balfanz et al. [BSSW02] based on a






authenticateAlice(h)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check h = H(mˆ)
output: Alice, mˆ
Fig. 4. Non-Interactive Message Authentication using a CRHF.
Note that the authenticated string is constant for all instances of the pro-
tocol which use the same input m, i.e. the authenticated string is H(m). This
characteristic allows adversaries to run completely oﬄine attacks. An attacker
has simply to find a collision on the hash function between two messages m1 and
m2 and then succeeds with probability 1.
Theorem 1 ([Vau05]). Let µ be the overall time complexity of the message
authentication protocol in Fig. 4 using weak authentication. We denote by T ,
Q, and p the time complexity, number of oracle queries launch, and probability
of success of adversaries, respectively. There is a generic transformation which
transforms any adversary into a collision finder on H whose complexity is T+µQ
and probability of success is p.
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In short, the best known oﬄine attack against this protocol is the collision
attack. An adversary has a probability of success of 1 − e−
1
2
T 22−k by using T
hashes computations. It clearly succeeds for T = O(2k/2). Collision resistance
requires the number of authenticated bits to be at least 160 and cannot be
reduced considering oﬄine attacks and using only weak authentication.
3.2 A NIMAP with Strong Authentication
The Gehrmann-Mitchell-Nyberg MANA I [GMN04] protocol is depicted in Fig. 5.1
MANA I uses a universal hash function family H. Proposed constructions
lead to 16–20 bit long SAS values but require strong authentication. Indeed,
using weak authentication, an adversary who gets authenticate(K||µ) has enough
time to find a message mˆ such that µ = HK(mˆ) and to substitute m with mˆ. We






pick K ∈U {0, 1}
k
µ← HK(m)
authenticateAlice(K||µ)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check µ = HK(mˆ)
output: Alice, mˆ
Fig. 5. The MANA I Protocol.
Theorem 2. Given an ǫ-universal hash function family H, any adversary which
is bounded by a complexity T and by QA (resp. QB) instances of Alice (resp. Bob)
against the protocol of Fig. 5 using stall-free authentication has a probability of
success at most QAQBǫ.
Proof. A one-shot adversary has no advantage to send mˆ before it has received
m and he cannot send mˆ after K||µ is released. Indeed, he would not be able to
send mˆ after receiving K||µ due to the stall-free assumption. Thus, the attacker
must select m and mˆ and hope that HK(mˆ) = HK(m). Clearly, the assumption
on H limits the probability of success to ǫ.
Now, consider powerful adversaries. Using Lemma 1, we can deduce that the
probability of success of an adversary is at most QAQBǫ. ⊓⊔
1 Note that the original MANA I protocol is followed by an authenticated acknowl-
edgment from Bob to Alice in [GMN04].
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4 A Proposed NIMAP with Weak Authentication
Consider the protocol depicted on Fig. 6 in which the message m is transmitted
by sending (c, d) ← commit(Kp,m). This message can be recovered by anyone
using the open function. To authenticate this message, the hashed value of c is
sent using an authenticated channel. We prove that this protocol is secure with





−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ mˆ← open(Kp, cˆ, dˆ)
h← H(c)
authenticateAlice(h)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ check h = H(cˆ)
output: Alice, mˆ
Fig. 6. Non-Interactive Message Authentication Based on a WCRHF.
deterministic commitment scheme is the heart of the protocol since an attacker
cannot predict the c value and thus cannot predict the H(c) value which is the
authenticated one.
Lemma 2. Consider the message authentication protocol depicted in Fig. 6. We
assume that the function H is a (T +µ, ǫh)-weakly collision resistant hash func-
tion and the commitment scheme is a (T + µ, ǫc)-trapdoor commitment scheme
in the CRS model (resp. oracle commitment scheme). There exists a (small)
constant µ such that for any T , any one-shot adversary against this message
authentication protocol with complexity bounded by T has a probability of success
p smaller than ǫh + ǫc.
Recall that the c value is sent through the insecure broadband channel and
thus has not to be minimized. Thus, we can use an ǫc as small as desired since
we can use any commitment scheme as secure as desired.
Assuming thatH is optimally WCR, the best WCR attack using T hash com-
putations has a probability of success ǫh ≈ 1−e
−T2−k . So, we need T = Ω(2k) to
succeed with a one-shot attack. Thus, using the same amount of authenticated
bits as the protocol of Fig. 4, our protocol has a better resistance against oﬄine
attacks. Equivalently, we can achieve the same security as the protocol of Fig. 4,
but using only half amount of authenticated bits, e.g. 80 bits.
Proof. A one-shot adversary A against the protocol in Fig. 6 follows the game
depicted on Fig. 7(a) in which it runs a man-in-the middle attack. Clearly, it
can be reduced to an adversary A who plays the game described in Fig. 7(b).
Assume a one-shot adversary A bounded by a complexity T . Given c, the
adversary A has to find a cˆ such that H(cˆ) = H(c). In addition, it must find
a dˆ which opens to mˆ (using cˆ) which is different from the input m. He can of
course choose a cˆ either equal or either different to c. We study the two cases.


























←−−−−−−− (c, d)← commit(Kp,m)
cˆ||dˆ
−−−−−−−→ mˆ← open(Kp, cˆ, dˆ)
Winning condition: H(cˆ) = H(c) and m 6= mˆ
(b)
Fig. 7. Game Against the Proposed Protocol (a) and Reduced Game (b).
Case 1. (cˆ = c) The adversary A chooses cˆ equal to c and obviously fulfills the
condition H(cˆ) = H(c). As depicted on Fig. 8, we can reduce the adversary
A to an adversary against the binding game of Fig. 6. We use an algorithm
B bounded by complexity µ which plays the binding game with a challenger
C on one side and simulates a challenger for A on the other side at the same
time. Using adversary A and algorithm B, we construct an adversary AB
which plays the binding game. Note that adversary AB has a complexity
bounded by T + µ.
First, the challenger C generates the pair of keys (Kp,KS) and sends Kp to
B. B sends it to A and receives a message m from A. He computes (c, d)
using the commit function with Kp and sends c||d to A. As assumed, A
chooses a cˆ equal to c and also sends cˆ||dˆ to B. B can now deduce mˆ using
the open function with inputs c and dˆ. Finally, B sends all required values
to the challenger C.
Note that B simulates perfectly a challenger for A. Hence, A and AB win
their respective game at the same time. Consequently, both win with the
same probability of success. Recall that the probability of success of an
adversary bounded by a complexity T +µ against the binding game of Fig. 6
is smaller than ǫc when the commitment scheme is a (T + µ, ǫc)-trapdoor
commitment. Hence, the probability that A succeeds and c = cˆ is at most
ǫc. Note that this case equally applies to trapdoor commitment schemes.
Case 2. (cˆ 6= c) The adversary A searches a cˆ different from c. As depicted on
Fig. 9, we can reduce the adversary A to an adversary against a second
preimage search game. We use an algorithm B bounded by a complexity









←−−−−−−− (c, d)← commit(Kp,m)
(cˆ = c)
cˆ||dˆ
−−−−−−−→ mˆ← open(Kp, c, dˆ)
m||mˆ||c||d||dˆ
−−−−−−−→ m = open(Kp, c, d)
mˆ = open(Kp, c, dˆ)
Winning condition: mˆ,m 6=⊥ and mˆ 6= m
Fig. 8. Reduction to the SB game (cˆ = c).
µ with the help of one query to the equivocate oracle. B plays the second
preimage game with a challenger C on one side and simulate a challenger
for A on the other side at the same time. Using adversary A and algorithm
B, we construct an adversary AB which plays the second preimage game
with the challenger C. Note that adversary AB has a complexity bounded
by T + µ.
First, B generates the keys and sends Kp to A. B receives a message m from
A and receives a challenge c from C . B can deduce the decommit value d
by calling the oracle equivocate(m, c). Note that c has been picked uniformly
and consequently the distribution of (c, d) is the same as if they have been
yield by the commit algorithm. Then, B can send c||d to A. A sends a cˆ||dˆ







←−−−−−−− pick c ∈U C
c||d
←−−−−−−− d← equivocateKs(m, c)
cˆ||dˆ
−−−−−−−→ mˆ← openKp(cˆ, dˆ)
cˆ
−−−−−−−→
Winning condition: H(cˆ) = H(c) and m 6= mˆ
Fig. 9. Reduction to the WCR Game with Trapdoor Commitment (cˆ 6= c).
Note that B simulates perfectly a challenger for A. Hence, A and AB win
their respective game at the same time and consequently with the same
probability of success. Recall that the probability of success of an adversary
against a second preimage game bounded by a complexity T + µ is smaller
than ǫh when H is a (T + µ, ǫh)-weakly collision-resistant hash function.
Hence, the probability that A succeeds and c 6= cˆ is at most ǫh. Note that
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the proof equally applies to oracle commitment schemes since it is unlikely
that the challenge c was output by a commit oracle.
We conclude that any one-shot adversary bounded by a complexity T against
the protocol of Fig. 6 has a probability of success smaller than ǫc + ǫh when the
protocol uses a (T + µ, ǫh)-weakly collision resistant hash function H and a
(T + µ, ǫc)-trapdoor commitment scheme. ⊓⊔
We consider now powerful adversaries.
Theorem 3. Consider the message authentication protocol of Fig. 6. We as-
sume that the function H is a (T +µ, ǫh)-weakly collision resistant hash function
and the commitment scheme is a (T +µ, ǫc)-trapdoor commitment scheme in the
CRS model (resp. oracle commitment scheme). There exists a (small) constant µ
such that for any T , any adversary against this message authentication protocol
with complexity bounded by T and with number of Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) instances
bounded by QA (resp. QB) has a probability of success p at most QA(ǫh + ǫc).
Assuming that WCR hash functions and trapdoor commitments such that
ǫc ≪ ǫh = O(T2
−k) exist, we have p = O(T ·QA2
−k). As an example, assuming
that an adversary is limited to QA ≤ 2
10, T ≤ 270, and that the security level
requires p ≤ 2−20, the protocol of Fig. 4 requires k ≥ 160 and our protocol
requires k ≥ 100. Using MD5 [Riv92], our protocol still achieves a quite luxurious
security even though collisions have been found on MD5 [WY05].
Proof. Consider an adversary who launches QA instances of Alice and QB in-
stances of Bob. Clearly, we can simulate all instances of Bob, pick one who will
make the attack succeed, and launch only this one. Hence, we reduce to QB = 1.
Recall from Lemma 2 that any one-shot adversary has a probability of success
smaller than ǫh + ǫc. Using Lemma 1, we conclude that any adversary has a
probability of success at most QA(ǫh + ǫc). ⊓⊔
5 On the Required Entropy of Authenticated
Communications
Using a weak authenticated channel, adversaries can delay or replay authenti-
cated messages. With non-interactive protocols an adversary can run the catalog
attack: i.e. he launches several instances of Alice and recover many authenticated
SAS. He launches one Bob and use one SAS of the catalog.
We would like to upper bound the security of an arbitrary message authenti-
cation protocol given the amount of authenticated strings it uses. Assume that
the protocol is used between Alice and Bob. We suppose that the protocol can
use any sequence of authenticated messages in a given set S during the protocol.
We call it a transcript. Note that authenticated strings are interleaved with reg-
ular messages which are not represented in the transcript. For any input message
m, the used transcript during a protocol instance is picked in the set S of all
possible transcripts with a distribution Dm.
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Theorem 4. We consider an arbitrary message authentication protocol between
Alice and Bob which uses an authenticated channel. Let S be the set of all possible
protocol transcripts through the authentication channel for any input message.
Let s be its cardinality. There exists a generic one-shot attack with probability of
success at least 1s − 2
−t which runs in polynomial time in terms of t.
Proof. We consider a general man-in-the-middle attack in which the adversary
first picks m ∈U {0, 1}
t and mˆ ∈U {0, 1}
t and launches Alice with input m.
The attack runs synchronized protocols between Alice and a simulator for Bob,
and a simulator for Alice with input mˆ and Bob. Following the attack, every
authenticated message which must be sent by the simulator is replaced by an
authenticated message which has just been received by the simulator.
Let SASm be the (random) sequence of all authenticated strings (the tran-
script) which would be exchanged in the protocol between Alice and the simu-
lator if the simulator where honest, and SASmˆ be the similar sequence between
the simulator and Bob. Clearly, if SASmˆ = SASm, the attack succeeds. Note
that an attack makes sense only if mˆ is different of m.
We have
Pr[success] = Pr[SASm = SASmˆ and m 6= mˆ]
≥ Pr[SASm = SASmˆ]− Pr[m = mˆ].
Note that SASm and SASmˆ are two identically distributed independent ran-
dom variables whose support are included in S. Due to Lemma 3 (see Appendix)
we can write Pr[SASm = SASmˆ] ≥
1
s . Since m and mˆ are uniformly distributed





with equality if and only if the SAS distribution is uniform among the set S. ⊓⊔
We finally provide a generic attack in the general case.
Theorem 5. We consider an arbitrary NIMAP between Alice and Bob which
uses a weak authenticated channel. Let S be the set of all possible protocol tran-
scripts through the authentication channel for any input message. Let s be its
cardinality. There exists a generic attack which uses QA instances of Alice and
an oﬄine complexity O(T ) with probability of success approximately 1−e−
T ·QA
s .
Proof (Sketch). We consider the generic attack in which the adversary starts by
simulating T Alice instances launched with random inputs mˆi and obtains a list
of possible SAS, i.e. ŜASi. Then, he launches QA real instances of Alice with
random inputs mj and consequently obtains QA authenticated SAS, i.e. SASj .
The attack succeeds when at least one authenticated SAS released by Alice
corresponds to a computed one, i.e. there exists k, ℓ such that SASk = ŜASℓ.
The adversary can launch a single Bob with input mˆℓ by simulating Alice and
can use SASk for the authentication when needed.
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If the distribution of all SAS is uniform, we have a birthday effect and thus
the probability of success is approximately 1 − e−
T ·QA
s . When the distribution
is not uniform, the probability is even larger (see Appendix B of [Pas05]). ⊓⊔
Theorem 4 says that there exists a one-shot attack against any message au-
thentication protocol which succeeds with probability essentially 1s where s is the
size of S. Theorem 5 says that there exists a generic attack against any NIMAP
which uses a weak authenticated channel which succeeds with probability essen-
tially 1−e−
T ·QA
s where QA is the number of instances of Alice used. Hence, they
cannot be secure unless T ·QA is negligible against s. Thus, any NIMAP which
is secure for T ·QA ≪ s is optimal.
Consequently, our proposed protocol is optimal due to Theorem 3 provided
that WCR hash functions and trapdoor commitment schemes such that ǫc ≪
ǫh = O(T2
−k) exist. By comparison with our protocol, we can note that the
protocol of Fig. 4 is not optimal.
6 Applications
One key issue in cryptography is to setup secure communications over insecure
channels, such as Internet. We know that using public key cryptography it is
possible by exchanging public keys in an authenticated way. The proposed pro-
tocol is used in this case for public key authentications, e.g. GPG public keys.
Typical applications where public key cryptography is used, and consequently
public key authentication is required, are
– distant hosts authentication, e.g. SSH
– e-mail authentication, e.g. GPG signature
– secure e-mail, e.g. GPG encryption
– secure voice over IP, e.g. PGPfone
Another possible application can be authentication of legal documents. For
instance, if two persons would exchange a document without complex appendix,
such as GPG signature, they can simply send the corresponding commit and
decommit values and then authenticate the hashed commit value. The recipient
can check whether or not it is correct. Note that integrity is protected.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new non-interactive message authentication
protocol based on a commitment scheme. It has the same security as the currently
used in SSH against one-shot attacks but using only half authenticated bits, e.g.
80 bits. 100 bits only are required against more general attacks. Indeed, due
to the commitment scheme, the authenticated value is not foreseeable and the
protocol is resistant to collision attacks. The latter theorem proposes that our
protocol is optimal. We can in addition conclude on the non-optimality of the
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protocol used today, but the question about MANA I is still opened. Finally, we
stress that the security of our protocol relies essentially on the hardness of the
SB game of the commitment scheme and on the hardness on the WCR game of
the hash function.
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Appendix
Lemma 3. Let X and Y be two identically distributed independent random vari-
ables with distribution D over a support set S. We have




with equality if and only if D is the uniform distribution.
Proof. Let s be the size of the set S. We have
Pr[X = Y ] =
∑
Si∈S
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where pi is Pr[X = Si].
Let us write pi =
1



























ρ2i . The sum of ρ
2
i is greater or equal
to 0. Note that it is equal to 0 if and only if all ρi are null, i.e. D is uniform. ⊓⊔
